Book Preview

Abstract

To know who we are, Filipinos, we must know who we were, Indios. On the one hand, we have few precolonial documents which might tell who the Indio was; on the other hand, the Filipino is the Westernized Indio. The Filipino is who the West says the Filipino is. According to Western research, the Filipino, like all Orientals, is a residual category of the Occidental: not Western. There is need of independent Asian research. The only really ancient documents connecting the Filipino with the Indio are perhaps our music and dance, and, above all, our languages, surely, our national language. The irony of it, it is precisely these that the Filipino government has removed from the curriculum of higher education. They are said to distract the youth from change, burdening them instead

[1] This **Note** is lifted in abbreviated form and applied to a current issue in Philippine education from the Introduction to a forthcoming book: *The Human Organization. Science, not Scientism. Technology, not Technocracy. Language, not Linguistics*.

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with the heavy baggage of the past. But what is change? Is it continuity or discontinuity? *Ang hindi marunong lumingon sa pinanggalingan ay hindi makararating sa paroroonan.* The High School graduate is helpless against bully scholarship. Higher education is the proper center for Asian research, one that will not assume that the West has the exclusive franchise on reason and efficiency; one that can meet theory with theory. We cannot overemphasize that if East and West are not dichotomous, still they are different. In order for our leaders to be able to successfully manage the difference, Asian research must reveal why and how they are different, why and how they must combine, if only so that our institutions may become more effective and more just. If we want to modernize quickly, copy superior technology but keep the faith in our traditions, in ourselves: *sa ating pinanggalingan.*

Keywords: *Change, History, Nature, Culture, Technology*

"Who are we, Filipinos?" is a question about our identity as a people. It is not about the citizen, for the Filipino citizen is quickly identified. When Andres Bonifacio and his compatriots tore their *cedulas*, I don't think they wanted to symbolize they were not Filipinos. Or did they? We have been cautioned not to dilute being Filipino with foreign ideas and ideals of colonizers. The irony is that

the Filipino is the Westernized Indio. To know who we are, mustn't we know who the Indio was before he was Filipinized? A word of wisdom from our original millennials: *Ang hindi marunong lumingon sa pinanggalingan ay hindi makararating sa paroroonan*.

For global and official communicative interaction, we now speak and write in English. We have no quarrel with that. But must we, too, do a Brexit? I thought the Angles, the Saxons, and the Normans came from continental Europe? Does the individual have to deny his individuality to be a member of a family? When the New Testament Christian is asked to leave father and mother for the Christ, does it mean dumping the Old like a cocoon in a metamorphosis? But the Christian keeps citing chapter and verse from the Old Testament to define who he or she is. Indeed, his name is Adam; her name is Eve. Are not the New Testament parables a dialectic of *sic et non,* not either-or? of continuity rather than discontinuity?

Admittedly, the search for origins raises a problem that is peculiar to the Philippines among the nation-states in Southeast Asia. Our pre-Hispanic *ninuno* (ancestors) did not leave us records of their thoughts and deeds—at best, a few scattered documents and inscriptions, but no body of myths or monuments that might tell us of their achievements prior to the coming of the Spaniard. Apparently, the oldest known document of pre-Hispanic times in the Philippines is the Laguna Copperplate Inscription, dated around 900 AD and

discovered in 1986. It may be that more clues will be discovered in the future. But in the meantime, how are we to learn about what our ancient forbearers thought and did, about what and who they were, prior to being taught or told what to think about themselves? How do we write their history not as prehistory but as history, our history?

Of course, the Filipino today is not the precolonial Indio. Between the old and the new, change has occurred. But what is change? Is it moving from one place to another? Is it leaving the past behind, a *Gone with the Wind* event, as in Mitchell's novel by that title? Or is it continuity, like Aeneas carrying Anchises on his back out of burning Troy? Or like Takezo who became Musashi, a legendary swordsman, as told in the Japanese episodic novel by that name of Eiji Yoshikawa?[2] These three images suggest divergent attitudes to social change, succinctly summed up in the textbook division of the world into the traditional East and the modern West, the latter decoupled from the past, the former inseparably one with it. "East is East and West is West and never the twain shall meet," said Kipling, who offered a way out of the impasse other than the battlefield, where Eastern and Western lose all significance in the face of death the leveler. Dead, everything is the same. Kipling suggested leaving the old behind to be apprenticed in the new. Aeneas

[2] Eiji Yoshikawa, *Musashi.* Translated from the Japanese by Charles S. Terry, Foreword by Edwin O. Reischauer (New York: Kodansha USA, 2012).

refused to leave Anchises behind. But in Yoshikawa's novel, Takezo *became* Musashi. The Occidental was thinking physics; the Oriental was thinking metaphysics.

There are real grounds for the Oriental/Occidental division, one of them being the vagaries of history. The two hemispheres have contrasting histories. The modern West jettisoned the traditional like a ladder that had served its purpose. Europe even has a bloody, but triumphant, symbol of the exact moment of rupture: the French Revolution. It has a second, which is a more technical symbol of the triumph of modern science over religious dogmatism: the Industrial Revolution. No such metamorphosis occurred in the Orient, for it remained attached to its old traditions, even when it turned modern, as in Japan. The Jewish people were scattered in the Diaspora, but remained a nation after they ceased to be a nation-state. The Samurai institution may have disappeared in Japan, but not the Samurai ethic.

In Japanese feudal society, the *daimyo*, the lords ruling from the top, were followed by the samurai, who were then followed by the commoners, farmers, artisans, and traders, in the order of traditional social hierarchy. The samurai were a class apart, in the 'middle' class, but totally dependent on the lord. From him they received their existence and it was him they served with total loyalty. The samurai were the extended sword of the daimyo they served, so that when the world of the daimyo collapsed, the world of the samurai collapsed with it. Samurai of defeated lords were hunted

down by samurai of victorious lords. They were the *ronin*: samurai on the run, in search of new lords to serve. To survive, the roving samurai had to be a superior warrior, and superiority consisted in a superior weapon or a superior technique, or both.

The samurai stood between lord and commoner, and typically identified himself with the lord. The old way was total loyalty to the lord and total dependence on warrior skills. But now Takezo had gained new purpose in fighting for the common peasant, with whom, in the end, he was one. Purpose is not technique but direction. Takezo turned from serving the lord to serving the peasant, linking his fortune with the most vulnerable among the people. Takezo saw that he could provide what they needed: a technique of survival. There was need for the transfer of technology.

There is a thesis that the history of the Filipino really began with the discovery of the Islands by Ferdinand Magellan, the Portuguese sea captain with the Spanish mandate to reach the East by travelling west. We need not go into the details of the argument, for we do not doubt that the history of the Filipino began with the colonization by Spain, if, by definition, the Filipino is the westernized Indio of *Las Islas Filipinas*, named after Felipe Segundo of Spain. A Spanish friend once told me that in Catholic Spain, one did not celebrate birthdays, for even pigs have birthdays. Celebrated was the day one was christened, when one received a name, typically of the Saint of the Day in the

Catholic calendar. On this account of it, the history of the Filipino began at the historical moment when his westernization began: the discovery of the islands by Magellan in 1521 or their colonization by Miguel López de Legazpi in 1565. The logic is impeccable but only if we accept the premise. For the passage from Indio to Filipino was not a *Gone with the Wind* change, but a *Musashi* change, in which the Filipino remains one with the Indio, *is* the Indio. Such a transformation is not conceived ontically (physics), but ontologically (metaphysics), for ideas and ideals are constitutive of the latter but not of the former.

The concept of *Musashi* change, however, is problematic in our case. We have no Borobudur or Angkor Wat, nor records of kingdoms or empires such as the Srivijaya and Majapahit of Indonesia. The only truly ancient documents that we have are like footprints—*bakas ng kahapon*—our music and dance, and above all, our languages, surely our national language. But these, ironically, have been recently excluded by the Filipino government from the curriculum of higher education. The aim of the education of the Filipino, it is said, is progress through innovative change. The Filipino identity it presupposes is the Filipino of modern times, especially the vibrant youth of today, fondly referred to as The Millennials.

Precolonial Southeast Asia

Fr. Horacio de la Costa's *Asia and the Philippines*,[3] a small collection of essays, offers an indirect and general reconstruction of our precolonial past. The general picture it gives of Southeast Asia on "the eve of the Western impact" is one of Indianized, Sinicized, and Islamized kingdoms and empires. The social and political institutions of India, China, and Islam shaped the Southeast Asian states according to their image. But it was the Malays themselves, "with their amazing capacity for assimilation," who adopted the alien institutions as a superstructure on a "village society, without inducing any essential change in it."

> Indian and Chinese influence had imposed a superstructure of monarchical government, whereby the ruler, regarded as sacred because of some special relationship with the divine, governed through the mediation, in the Indianized states, of a blood aristocracy; in the Sinicized states, of a scholar-official class.[4]

The picture is of a region influenced by India, China, and Islam—except the Philippines. "The fact is . . . the social and political evolution of the Filipinos took place under the

[3] Horacio de la Costa, S.J., *Asia and the Philippines* (Manila: Solidaridad Publishing House, 1967).

[4] Ibid., 7.

influence neither of China nor of India but of a new religion: Islam."

We used to read that the Philippines, or a part of it, was once under the rule of the Srivijaya, but this has apparently been discounted by some historians, principally because of the sparsity of evidence of Hindu or Buddhist influence in the Islands, even in the Visayas.[5] But the precolonial presence and influence of Islam in the Philippines has never been in doubt. In the course of the fourteenth century, perhaps earlier in the thirteenth, De la Costa wrote that Islam was brought to Mindanao by a cadet of the ruling house of Johore, and to Luzon by Bornean chieftains who took over the government of Manila, its principal port. At any rate, it was these Muslim communities of merchant seamen that the Spaniards found to be the most advanced, culturally and politically, when they first set foot in the Philippines.[6]

Further advance of Islam in the Islands was dramatically halted by Legazpi's *Cruzada*, conquest by the cross and the sword in 1565. Had Legazpi arrived some fifty years later, some historians now believe, Northern Philippines might

[5] Patricio Abinales and Donna Amoroso, *State and Society in the Philippines* (Maryland: Rowman and Littlefield, 2005), 34. Except for the name, Abinales and Amoroso say, the Visayas (Luzon and Mindanao) show little Srivijaya (Buddhist or Hindu) cultural influence. Luis H. Francia, *A History of the Philippines: From Indios Bravos to Filipinos* (New York: The Overlook Press, 2010) believed that the influence of the Srivijaya empire extended to parts of the Philippine archipelago "with Srivijaya colonists . . . implanting the distinctive name of "Visayas" on its central cluster of islands." (38)

[6] De la Costa, *Asia and the Philippines*, 7

have turned Muslim, making the colonization of Luzon perhaps as difficult for Spain as Muslim Mindanao.[7] Ironically, wrote Eric Casiño, Filipinos seem to have forgotten that "the first symbol of power and authority in Manila . . . was not Miguel Lopez de Legazpi, the Christian Spaniard, but Sulayman, the Islamized Filipino [Indio?], proud offspring of Borneo and Luzon nobility."[8] But as fate would have it, only parts of Mindanao and the Visayas and of southern Luzon were Islamized by 1565. The Muslims leapfrogged as they moved northwards, which might indicate that they were mainly traders, like those of India and China, interested in creating trading posts more than crafting states.

For our purposes, the relevant proposition of de la Costa's precolonial Southeast Asia is this: the village society was the base society—the *communidad de base* of Liberation Theology—on which the civilizations of China, India, and Islam were superimposed. We take that to mean that the village society remained intact, but not untouched by the superstructure. What is a village society? De la Costa's definition does not deviate from the traditional one. It is "a community bound together by kinship or alliances assimilated

[7] Francia, *A History of the Philippines*, 91.

[8] Eric Casiño, "Sulayman's Manila," in Cynthia N. Lumbera and Teresita G. Maceda, eds., *Rediscovery* (Quezon City: National Bookstore, 1981), 21. "Filipinos have to be reminded that the religion of the Prophet found a home not only in the South but also in the North, not only in Cotabato and Jolo, but also in Manila, the nation's capital."

to kinship."[9] It matches the description of the traditional society by Max Weber and Ferdinand Tönnies' division of society into *Gemeinschaft* (community) and *Gesellschaft* (society). The former is familial, ruled and held together by the bonds of kinship; the latter is official, a rational system of offices or bureaus.

De la Costa further characterized the village society as "a society of status (rather than enterprise), based on an economy of subsistence (rather than exchange), governed by heads of families (rather than leaders or officials) according to customary (rather than written) law."[10] These added features, however, are already the result of comparing the traditional community with the modern society. By this comparison, the Muslim maritime community appeared an exception, for it was made of traders and had written laws. But we know from elsewhere that Islam, from its beginnings, always understood itself as a brotherhood, a term of kinship. If by status is meant social position, then, it does not say more or less than the respect for hierarchy, characteristic of the respect of elders in kinship systems. There are societies that are based on an exchange economy, governed by an officialdom and larger than a village. However, they remain a village society writ large, inasmuch and insofar as they remain fundamentally a *Gemeinschaft* in the sense of Tönnies, and feudal in the sense of Voltaire, who said that feudalism was a form of life and

[9] de la Costa, S.J., *Asia and the Philippines*, 7.
[10] Ibid.

not merely a unique event, as Montesquieu said. Because the social structure can be informed by contrary cultures, we must distinguish, but not dichotomize, the bureaucratic and the kinship societies.

The lack of documentary evidence made inevitable the indirect approach to pre-colonial Philippines. There was besides nothing controversial about the picture it generated. "Precolonial Southeast Asia," the first chapter of Fr. de la Costa's book, was originally a lecture given at a seminar for American teachers, and reflected on the common assessment of the Orient by Western scholarship.

> The apothegm of the Byzantine jurists of the Emperor Justinian, "*Quod placuit principi, legis habet vigorem* [The pleasure of the prince has the force of law], would have been perfectly acceptable to the kings of Angkor and Pagan; but the principle of the Magna Carta that no freeman could be arrested, imprisoned, deprived of his property, outlawed, exiled, or "in any way destroyed" except by "legal judgment of his peers or by the law of the land" would have been incomprehensible not only to the kings, but, more significantly, to their subjects.[11]

[11] de la Costa, S.J., *Asia and the Philippines,* 8.

Precolonial Southeast Asian society was the village society informed by one or two or all three Oriental civilizations of India, China, and Islam. The religion of India sought some ultimate reality behind appearances, which was attainable by those who could transcend the human condition through the power of magic, or the practice of asceticism. Essentially aristocratic, the Indian way was for a few and peaked in the sacred ruler, who was exempt from the laws that governed ordinary mortals. Confucianism introduced a humanist element into the Southeast Asian worldview, and in Islam, an egalitarian one.

The result of the ecological approach, if we may call the indirect approach of de la Costa, was already provided on a silver platter by what Edward Said called *Orientalism*. It invariably produced the same monotonous conclusion that the Oriental mind is traditional, and opposed to the modern Occidental mind, and that the Oriental society is the kinship society, and opposed to the rational Occidental society. Oriental society is the tribe, the clan, the family, the community—the *Gemeinschaft*—united by affective relations, subjective rather than objective, the opposite of the modern urban (bourgeois) society—the *Gesellschaft*—governed by reason and the ideals of individual liberty. On these terms, Chinese, Indian, and Islamic, civilizations were a village society writ large, "bound together by kinship or alliances assimilated to kinship." That was how Weber, probably the single most influential author in social science, described

Oriental societies as a whole: as the opposite of the rational society, to which he gave the name bureaucracy.

But the Western perspective is also not without problems. On the one hand, impersonality is claimed to be an essential feature of Occidental rationality; on the other hand, personal liberty is a major principle of Western society, which has obvious reference to the individual person. Also, Western scholarship tends to assume that the traditional community is a timeless and unhistorical phenomenon (form), not because the Orient lay outside time and space but because it remained the same despite the passage of time. In contrast, change is of the essence of the modern industrial society. *A Preindustrial Culture in the Scientific-Technological Age,* the subtitle of *The Crisis of Modern Islam* by Bassam Tibi[12] defines what Orientalist literature means by a 'timeless and unchanging Orient'.

The Changing Orient

A timeless and unchanging Orient is largely discredited today as an abstraction, and historians are revisiting the data to rectify the name. David Chandler rejected its application to Cambodia by earlier French historians, for it had clearly undergone tumultuous changes from internal and external forces as recently as the nineteenth and twentieth century. Chandler intended to undermine "the notion of changelessness . . . , for each of the

[12] Bassam Tibi, *The Crisis of Modern Islam: A Preindustrial Culture in the Scientific-Technological Age*, trans. Judith von Sivers, Foreword by Peter von Sivers (Salt Lake City: University of Utah Press, 1988).

chapters that follow records a major transformation in Cambodian life."[13] Barbara and Thomas Metcalf, rewriting the history of modern India, replaced the timeless and unchanging concept with that of discontinuity. There is a need in the writing of 'national' histories, "to show that commonsense notions of continuity, fostered by nationalism, must be replaced by an understanding of the newness of modern identities, and the new meanings infused into old terms." Metcalf claimed to have been cued to the new direction by Benedict Anderson's 'paradox of nationalism', namely, "that nation-states, a product of recent centuries, must always claim to be very, very old." [14] On the contrary, the nationalism behind the independence movements in the colonies was very, very new, being a reaction to Western nationalist colonial policy.

Although the new trend in writing national histories is veering away from the timeless view of traditional forms and events, modern Western histories have yet to veer away from the gone-with-the-wind concept of change. The Western polarization of East and West seems to imply it. In Weber's account of the passage from myth to science, religion was

[13] David Chandler, *A History of Cambodia*, 4th ed. (Chiang Mai, Thailand: Silkworm Books, 2008), 3.

[14] Barbara Metcalf and Thomas Metcalf, *A Concise History of Modern India*, 2nd ed. (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2006), xvi–xvii. According to the authors, the three-stage schema, inspired by the nationalism of historians, went something like this. There was the great Hindu civilization of old; then came the Muslims and the old Hindu civilization rigidified; then came the British who brought enlightened progress through modern science.

dropped like an old shirt. The Protestant Ethic did not evolve, but emerged, as from an eclipse. The same either-or concept of change seems to be behind John A. T. Robinson's *Honest to God,* which took its cue from Dietrich Bonhoeffer's suggestion of speaking of God in the secular terms of the modern secular mind—not that they had no reason to think so. But Weber, as sociologist, and Robinson and Bonhoeffer, as theologians, were thinking as Europeans of Europe of only a portion of Europe. Bonhoeffer had especially in mind a particular European experiment in nationalism: Nazism. They were not speaking for the world at large,[15] although apparently in their thinking, the European experience was paradigmatic: what was good (bad) for Europe was good (bad) for the world. Even Hilaire Belloc, a Catholic, ventured to say: "Europe is the Faith, and the Faith is Europe." Or as an American president of a management school once said to me: "There is no Asian management; there is only management in Asia."

One of the most respected Catholic theologians of the twentieth century, Karl Rahner, gave an address in 1979 at

[15] Marlé cautioned: "In describing Bonhoeffer . . . as a 'man of disturbing vision', I want to suggest that some of the traits of thought he sketches could easily lead to disastrous consequences. Some rash people have made him their authority for putting forward an attack on traditional Christianity which practically amounts to destroying it altogether. He himself . . . was aware of the dangers inherent in a study of obviously incomplete and one-sided reflexions of this kind, developed solely from a critical point of view. But I use the term 'disturbing' in a positive sense as well." See René Marlé, *Bonhoeffer: The Man and His Works,* trans. Rosemary Sheed (New York: Newman Press, 1968), 107.

the Weston School of Theology, Cambridge, Massachusetts, on the occasion of being awarded the honorary degree of Doctor of Humane Letters.[16] The subject was the theological significance of Vatican II (1962–1965). Rahner believed that it was "meaningful and justified to consider Vatican II as the first major official event in which the Church actualized itself precisely as a *world Church.*" The flip side of actualizing a world Church was de-Europeanizing the Church. He compared the missionary activity of the Church prior to Vatican II to that of an export firm. Christian Europe exported Christianity in the same manner that the British exported the railway system to India: a product made in Europe.

De-Europeanization was not rejection of European civilization and culture, but only of its "colossal one-sidedness."[17] The issue was, of course, anything but simple and clear. Wrote Rahner:

> Admittedly, such questions about the de-Europeanizing of the Church raise theoretical problems which are anything but clear. Must the marital morality of the Masais in East Africa

[16] Karl Rahner, "Towards a Fundamental Theological Interpretation of Vatican II," *Theological Studies* 40, no. 4 (December 1979): 716–727. The address probably serves to fix the exact moment when some European theologians began to take a more reserved attitude towards Rahner's theology.

[17] Paul Deussen as cited by J. L. Mehta, "Heidegger and Vedanta. Reflections on a Questionable Theme," in *Heidegger and Asian Thought,* ed. Graham Parkes (Honolulu: University of Hawaii Press), 25.

> simply reproduce the morality of Western Christianity, or could a chieftain there, even if he is a Christian, live in the style of the patriarch Abraham? Must the Eucharist even in Alaska be celebrated with grape wine? Theoretical questions like these imply, more often than not, theoretical hindrances to the actualization of the world Church as such. Along with many other reasons, they help us to understand that the full official actualization of the world Church began to appear at Vatican II in a relatively initial and diffident way. At Mass before the individual sessions, when the different rites of the Church were presented, one still could not see any African dances.[18]

Needless to say, Vatican II, as "the Church's first official self-actualization (*Selbstvollzug*) *as* a world Church," is still in the process of realization. The moves after Vatican II to increase the number of non-Europeans in the College of Cardinals; to ordain more non-European bishops and canonize more non-European saints; the translation of the Latin Mass into the vernacular; the introduction of indigenous music in liturgical celebrations; the relaxation of rules on clerical attire; the emergence of militant movements such as 'liberation theology' in South America and the formation of Christian *comunidades de base* (basic Christian

[18] Karl Rahner, "Towards a Fundamental Theological Interpretations," 718.

communities) all over the world; the idea that the Pope, the Bishop of Rome, could actually be an Asian or African or American; etc.—all of that has been part of the actualization of a world Church initiated by Vatican II.

Asian Research and the University

Our intention here is not to discuss the theological implications of Westernization, but to show that it is not an academic issue, even from the religious standpoint, and that it is an interdisciplinary issue in the academe. The Europeanization we denounce is the kind that reduces non-European civilizations to a residual category of the European: not European. We do not denounce science; we denounce the reduction of science to natural science at the expense of human science. The reason (apart from colonial history) why our schools have virtually become mere conduits of Western civilization is the fact that our school system has come from the West. But a more practical reason is that much of the funding for research came from Western sponsors. Funds for research in natural science and technology do not create the *Problematik* here contemplated, for 'fire burns here and in Persia'. The IRRI (International Rice Research Institute) at Los Baños continues to produce important technical results. It is research funding in the human sciences that typically has foreign strings attached.

That our Philippine schools have become a conduit of Western culture is especially evident in the social sciences.

With exceptions, of course, the underlying theme in social theory is still Weber's dichotomy between the modern impersonal bureaucracy and the traditional kinship system, which itself is merely an application of the more general theme of Weber: "Only we, judging from the standpoint of our modern views of nature, can distinguish objectively": what is correct and what is fallacious, what is rational and what is irrational, what is science and what is myth, what is technology and what is magic.[19]

Independent research would discover that the impersonal and objective organization, and its meritocratic system of rewards and punishments, are not viable institutions even in the West. Weber's rational society is an ideal type that does not exist and never existed. Precisely because it does not take the person, but only the performance into account—meritocracy has been rejected as an unjust system of rewards and punishments. This we have come to learn not from logic, but from experience, or from history. Social legislation (now covered under the term corporate governance) has put limits on both bureaucracy and meritocracy through regulation. Social legislation on the minimum wage, on working hours, on the hiring of women and children, on the right to

[19] Max Weber, *The Sociology of Religion*, trans. Ephraim Fischoff, Introduction by Talcott Parsons (Boston: Beacon Press, 1964), 2: "Only we, judging from the standpoint of our modern views of nature, can distinguish objectively in such behavior those attributes of causality which are 'correct' from those which are 'fallacious', and designate the fallacious attributions of causality as irrational, and the corresponding acts as 'magic'."

association, on trade unions, on social security, on health care, etc., is not about the work, but about the worker, the person and his/her rights, and the fundamental rights defended and celebrated in the Declaration of Independence of the American colonies, and even in the *Magna Carta*, if made to refer also to the commoner and not mainly to the noble men of England.

Independent research in the human sciences discovers that the Western dichotomies have been proven wrong and unviable by historical experience. The legislation against the employment of women and children, for instance, presupposes a level of political and economic development and cannot be understood absolutely or in the abstract. For in poor countries or poor areas of a country, the legislation may not make sense at all. In poor countries, the state is too poor to carry out adequate social service, unless the women and the children worked, they would starve. In such places and circumstances, children go to work, rather than to school. The result might be the ludicrous spectacle of policemen chasing and beating children for trying to earn a living because it is against the law. Nor is it always a case of irresponsible parents, for the adults themselves may be victims of the situation. Even in advanced economies, in times of recession, people want to work, but cannot find work. Unfortunately, it is the norm in poor countries, which lack the basic infrastructure for economic and social adequacy.

There is room for Oriental (African and Asian) research—one that does not reject Western research, but only its 'colossal one-sidedness'. By Oriental research, then, we do not mean research in the Orient or by Orientals. We mean research on the Oriental way of being and doing 'in and for itself' rather than in comparison with the West. Is there such a beast? The West claims there is a Western way and, more importantly, that the Western way is opposed to the Oriental way. They said it; we are merely taking it from there.

If something can be done about the situation, it is our universities and graduate schools that must take the initiative. The high school graduate is helpless against bully scholarship. Higher education is the proper center for Asian research, one that will not assume that the West has the exclusive franchise on reason and efficiency, and can meet theory with theory. We cannot overemphasize that if Western and Eastern research are not dichotomous, still they are different, even historically. In order for our leaders and governors to be able to successfully manage the difference, Asian research must reveal why and how they are different rather than dichotomous, why and how they must combine, if only so that our institutions may become more effective and more just.

The school is the institution formally charged to pass on the accumulated results of research to the next generation. We do not look down on the conduit-school; it is the normal school. But besides the conduit-school, a country must have

source-schools, unless it is content to tap the research of others, which may be different, which may not fit our historical situation. Thus, a conduit-school, in the sense we take it, is not merely a school that does little or no research of its own. An 'Asian' school that does a lot of research, but uses 'other' premises, is still a conduit-school in the sense taken here. Nor are the data sought only science data, the results of scientific research, for that would be scientism. In deed and in fact, the data which science and philosophy (and theology) build on are ultimately commonsense data, and what keeps science and philosophy (and theology) from flying wild into the blue yonder is common sense.

Asian research in the sense taken here makes little sense in the natural sciences, for fire burns here and everywhere else in this world. But Asian research in the human sciences makes good sense. In the meantime, we have come to understand more clearly the difference between science and philosophy, and we have learned to distinguish between natural and human science. We differentiate in order to integrate. We argue that the Western propensity to the dichotomy is its concept of a unitary science, in which the objective method of natural science as an action theory replaces the subjective method of human science as an actor-action theory.

Our concept of change is *Musashi,* rather than Gone With the Wind. The difference in the colonization of North and South America may help clarify the transformative change we

have in mind. The colonization of North America (the United States and Canada) did not require transformative change in the population, for the colonizers from the Old World merely replaced the natives of the New World.[20] By contrast, in South America as in Asia and Africa, such exclusion was not feasible given the size alone of the native population. This difference in colonial history adequately explains how North America was able to industrialize rapidly, while South America, Asia, and Africa have taken and are taking a longer time. Japan was able to modernize swiftly so that by 1905 its navy beat the Russian navy. Japan modernized quickly by copying Western technology, not Western culture. Japan's achievement might have given Lenin the idea that Communism should adopt American Scientific Management separated from its capitalist ideology. Communist China finally tried it and has become the second largest economy in the world after the first, the United States of America. Japan is third.

The Afro-Asian scholar must not hesitate, but must make it a point to refer to Oriental traditions and its sages. Modern scholars seem embarrassed and apologetic for seeking corroboration from philosophers of antiquity and—heaven forbid—from Oriental sages. In typical modern scholarly studies, referring to antiquity for support is antiquarian; to

[20] The same may be said of Australia and New Zealand (and modern Israel?).

Oriental wisdom, byzantine. But if there is West, there must be East, unless, of course, western is claimed to mean the same as universal. Fewer and fewer scholars today would make such a claim.

If then we want to know who we are, then we must do independent research. If we want to modernize more rapidly, then let us copy superior technology, but keep the faith—in our traditions, in ourselves: *sa ating pinanggalingan*.